“In her book Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948, the late Professor Tanya Reinhart suggested an immediate withdrawal by Israel from all of the Gaza Strip and 90% of the West Bank (it was written before Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza was announced), arguing that only by doing this would the two sides be ready to negotiate the core issues, such as water and Jerusalem. Reinhart’s argument lacks pragmatism in that she failed to outline and defend any possible negative outcomes of such a move. Thus, her idea is be attractive to those of her readers who are already convinced that an immediate unilateral withdrawal by Israel is the best way to produce a negotiated peace. Israel has withdrawn from Gaza, but not from the West Bank – Reinhart suggested Israel immediately vacate 90% of that territory – thus, discussing her argument is still valid.

A unilateral withdrawal certainly had the potential to create movement in the peace process, but there are, however, probable serious consequences of such a withdrawal. There is little, if any, chance that Israel will make such a move without ensuring its interests are protected – especially since the withdrawal from Gaza has failed to protect Israel’s security interests. Though Reinhart added an aside that withdrawing from 90% of the West Bank will remove Israel’s ability to defend the remaining settlements, she made no comment on the ramifications of this. And, given the almost total lack of security control the PA has over territories under its authority, it is hard to see any consequence of Israel withdrawing other than a flood of Palestinian terrorists and rockets into the country. Yet Reinhart insisted “the only way is to begin right now”.

Given the fact that a state will not make a unilateral action until preparations for the consequences of that action have been made, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s efforts to ‘disengage’ Israel unilaterally from the Gaza Strip are worth highlighting. On the surface, at least, Sharon’s plan seemed similar to that of Reinhart’s. Reinhart viewed withdrawal (also from most of the West Bank) as a precondition for negotiations (thereby removing one of Israel’s strongest negotiating assets). Sharon, on the other hand, viewed negotiating with the Palestinians as a process of no value. This was because, in Sharon’s opinion, those Palestinians able to assert security control (a key Israeli demand) are unwilling to do so, whereas those who claim to be ready to do so are politically and militarily unable. Indeed, the disengagement plan reads “Israel has come to the conclusion that there is currently no reliable Palestinian partner with which it can make progress in a bilateral peace process.” When viewed in this light, one can see the differences in the two plans. Sharon judged Gaza as not economically, militarily or culturally worth the associated costs of retaining. However, parts of the West Bank are. Hence the political windfall of Bush’s letter to Sharon suggesting that the Palestinians should not expect full Israeli withdrawal from all of the West Bank. It is my opinion that Sharon intended to annex the major settlement blocs and, should the Palestinians not be ready to negotiate (in Sharon’s eyes), he would, at some point in the future, have presumably announced a disengagement from most of the West Bank. After Sharon left the scene, Ehud Olmert announced just that – but the rocket fire from Gaza and Lebanon in 2006 convinced him the plan was foolish. The ongoing construction of the security fence along or near the Green Line and around the major settlement blocs protects Israel from suicide bombers, but not rockets. Until a solution is found for the latter, Israel isn’t going anywhere.

Ultimately, Reinhart belonged to that category of thinkers motivated by what they think should be done, but refuse to be grounded by the reality of what is actually possible. Hope is great, but hope without pragmatism is foolishness.”